Weber Law Firm, P.C.

Weber Law Firm, P.C.
Weber Law Firm, P.C.

Weber Law Firm, P.C.

Firm Overview

Main Office

Main Office
6666 Harwin Drive #220
Houston, TX 77036

Phone

(713) 789-3300

Websites

www.weberlaw.com

Bankruptcy

"Board Certified * Bankruptcy Advice at a Reasonable Price"

Weber Law Firm provides aggressive, cost effective representation of debtors (both business and consumer) and creditors in Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases (both voluntary and involuntary) filed in the Houston, Galveston and College Station areas. We represent small businesses and consumers that need bankruptcy debt relief and want to either completely eliminate debt and contract obligations, or reorganize their affairs by lowering debt payments.

We Like Bankruptcy Litigation!

Most Houston bankruptcy lawyers do not like litigation. Bankruptcy litigation is the process of resolving disputed legal issues in court. Most lawyers in Houston will refuse to participate in complex legal disputes that arise in bankruptcy cases, such as discharge contests, preference claim defense, fraudulent conveyances, exemption contests, mortgage disputes and automatic stay violations. Although most bankruptcy professionals dislike litigation, we enjoy the challenge involved in handling contested disputes. We will be happy to offer a second opinion and represent both debtors and creditors in litigation matters which your current lawyer may not desire or be competent to handle. We also take referrals of bankruptcy litigation cases from local attorneys that do not like or have experience handling litigation.

Practice Areas:

Chapter 7. Straight bankruptcy, also referred to as a "liquidation proceeding." Normally ends is a discharge (release) of most debts without payment or giving up any property.

Chapter 11. Reorganization of business and consumer debts. Corporations and individuals.

Chapter 13. Reorganization of business and personal debts. Only available to individuals and sole proprietorships.

Bankruptcy Litigation. Prosecution and defense of discharge and dischargeability contests, defense of preference claims, defense of fraudulent conveyance claims, defense of exemption contests, prosecution and defense of home mortgage claims, and the prosecution and defense of automatic stay violations.

What distinguishes your law firm from others?

Our Goal: Provide Competent, Efficient and Aggressive Representation at a Reasonable Price

Weber Law Firm, P.C.
William Weber

Born: 1955, Mt. Lebanon, PA.

Board Certifications: Consumer Bankruptcy Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization (1997) (recertified 2002, 2008 & 2012).

Courts Admitted: All Texas state courts (1983); U.S. District Courts Southern, Northern & Western Districts of Texas; U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (1983); U.S. Supreme Court (1994).

Memberships: Member, State Bar of Texas (1983-present); Member, State Bar of Texas, Bankruptcy Section; Member, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1998-2008, 2013-Present); Member, Houston Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1997-Present).

Significant Decisions:

Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), affirmed, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex. 2014), affirmed, , 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), reversed, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), opinion on remand, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 14750 (5th Cir. 2016).

Description: Creditor filed a dischargeability lawsuit in bankruptcy court claiming that Debtor, a shareholder and officer of a corporation, was personally liable for a contract debt owed by the corporation to a creditor. Creditor alleged that the debt owed to it was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, based on theories of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and willful injury to property under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2), (4) and (6). Creditor also alleged that an avoidable conveyance of corporate assets by Debtor was an "actual fraud" as that term is used in 523(a)(2)(A). At trial, it was undisputed that Debtor never made a false representation to Creditor. The Bankruptcy Court, after a three day trial, issued an opinion in favor of the Debtor, holding that Debtor was not guilty of actual fraud, because proof of a false representation was an essential element of a claim for actual fraud under 523(a)(2). Therefore. the debt owed to Creditor was dischargeable. On appeal, both the U.S. District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued separate opinions affirming the Bankruptcy Court decision, indicating that an avoidable conveyance of assets did not constitute "actual fraud" as used is 523(a)(2)(A), and that a false representation was an essential element of an "actual fraud" claim under 523(a)(2).

Outcome: On a further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 7 to 1 majority (Justice Thomas dissenting) reversed the opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit. It held that proof that Debtor made a false representation is not an essential element of an actual fraud claim under 523(a)(2)(A), and that an avoidable conveyance of assets made with an intent to hinder or delay creditors could constitute "actual fraud" under 523(a)(2)(A).

McDonald, 486 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

Description: Did Debtor abandon her homestead by temporarily moving from her Texas home to New Orleans to pursue an employment opportunity.

Outcome: No. Debtor did not abandon her homestead under the circumstances. A homestead exemption may be lost or abandoned by a removal from the premises under circumstances clearly indicating that the removal is not merely temporary. A homestead claimant is not required to remain on the homestead property at all times; rather, the claimant may be absent from the property as long as the absence is temporary. One does not necessarily abandon a homestead by merely moving his home. The length of time of an absence is not dispositive in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent; rather, the overriding consideration in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent is the homestead claimant's intent.

Oparaji v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Oparaji), 454 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010), affirmed, 458 B.R. 881 (S.D. Tex. 2011), reversed, 698 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2013).

Description: Plaintiff Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion for summary judgment on his claim that defendant creditor should be judicially estopped from asserting charges that could have been, but were not, included in its proof of claim filed in debtor's previous bankruptcy case.

Outcome: In the Bankruptcy Court and District Court appeal, the Courts ruled the Creditor was judicially estopped from claiming charges or fees in a second bankruptcy case that were inconsistent with charges or fees claimed in a proof of claim filed in a prior, dismissed bankruptcy case. This ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Endeavour GP, LLC v. Endeavour Highrise, L.P. et al, 432 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).

Description: Is an IRA Account a proper party that may be named as a party to a lawsuit?

Outcome: Yes. If faced with the issue of an IRA's ability to be sued, the Texas Supreme Court would decide that IRAs should be treated like trusts.

See other significant cases at: http://weberlaw.com/attorney/

License

Bar Number: 21045500
Texas, 1983

Education

Ohio University
A.B. (summa cum laude), 1979

University of Houston Law Center
J.D. (cum laude) (Class Rank: 19/332 top 6%)., 1983

Weber Law Firm, P.C.
William Weber

Born: 1955, Mt. Lebanon, PA.

Board Certifications: Consumer Bankruptcy Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization (1997) (recertified 2002, 2008 & 2012).

Courts Admitted: All Texas state courts (1983); U.S. District Courts Southern, Northern & Western Districts of Texas; U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (1983); U.S. Supreme Court (1994).

Memberships: Member, State Bar of Texas (1983-present); Member, State Bar of Texas, Bankruptcy Section; Member, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1998-2008, 2013-Present); Member, Houston Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1997-Present).

Significant Decisions:

Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), affirmed, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex. 2014), affirmed, , 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), reversed, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), opinion on remand, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 14750 (5th Cir. 2016).

Description: Creditor filed a dischargeability lawsuit in bankruptcy court claiming that Debtor, a shareholder and officer of a corporation, was personally liable for a contract debt owed by the corporation to a creditor. Creditor alleged that the debt owed to it was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, based on theories of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and willful injury to property under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2), (4) and (6). Creditor also alleged that an avoidable conveyance of corporate assets by Debtor was an "actual fraud" as that term is used in 523(a)(2)(A). At trial, it was undisputed that Debtor never made a false representation to Creditor. The Bankruptcy Court, after a three day trial, issued an opinion in favor of the Debtor, holding that Debtor was not guilty of actual fraud, because proof of a false representation was an essential element of a claim for actual fraud under 523(a)(2). Therefore. the debt owed to Creditor was dischargeable. On appeal, both the U.S. District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued separate opinions affirming the Bankruptcy Court decision, indicating that an avoidable conveyance of assets did not constitute "actual fraud" as used is 523(a)(2)(A), and that a false representation was an essential element of an "actual fraud" claim under 523(a)(2).

Outcome: On a further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 7 to 1 majority (Justice Thomas dissenting) reversed the opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit. It held that proof that Debtor made a false representation is not an essential element of an actual fraud claim under 523(a)(2)(A), and that an avoidable conveyance of assets made with an intent to hinder or delay creditors could constitute "actual fraud" under 523(a)(2)(A).

McDonald, 486 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

Description: Did Debtor abandon her homestead by temporarily moving from her Texas home to New Orleans to pursue an employment opportunity.

Outcome: No. Debtor did not abandon her homestead under the circumstances. A homestead exemption may be lost or abandoned by a removal from the premises under circumstances clearly indicating that the removal is not merely temporary. A homestead claimant is not required to remain on the homestead property at all times; rather, the claimant may be absent from the property as long as the absence is temporary. One does not necessarily abandon a homestead by merely moving his home. The length of time of an absence is not dispositive in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent; rather, the overriding consideration in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent is the homestead claimant's intent.

Oparaji v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Oparaji), 454 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010), affirmed, 458 B.R. 881 (S.D. Tex. 2011), reversed, 698 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2013).

Description: Plaintiff Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion for summary judgment on his claim that defendant creditor should be judicially estopped from asserting charges that could have been, but were not, included in its proof of claim filed in debtor's previous bankruptcy case.

Outcome: In the Bankruptcy Court and District Court appeal, the Courts ruled the Creditor was judicially estopped from claiming charges or fees in a second bankruptcy case that were inconsistent with charges or fees claimed in a proof of claim filed in a prior, dismissed bankruptcy case. This ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Endeavour GP, LLC v. Endeavour Highrise, L.P. et al, 432 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).

Description: Is an IRA Account a proper party that may be named as a party to a lawsuit?

Outcome: Yes. If faced with the issue of an IRA's ability to be sued, the Texas Supreme Court would decide that IRAs should be treated like trusts.

See other significant cases at: http://weberlaw.com/attorney/

License

Bar Number: 21045500
Texas, 1983

Education

Ohio University A.B. (summa cum laude), 1979


University of Houston Law Center J.D. (cum laude) (Class Rank: 19/332 top 6%)., 1983


Firm Overview

Main Office

Main Office
6666 Harwin Drive #220
Houston, TX 77036

Phone

(713) 789-3300

Websites

www.weberlaw.com

Bankruptcy

"Board Certified * Bankruptcy Advice at a Reasonable Price"

Weber Law Firm provides aggressive, cost effective representation of debtors (both business and consumer) and creditors in Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases (both voluntary and involuntary) filed in the Houston, Galveston and College Station areas. We represent small businesses and consumers that need bankruptcy debt relief and want to either completely eliminate debt and contract obligations, or reorganize their affairs by lowering debt payments.

We Like Bankruptcy Litigation!

Most Houston bankruptcy lawyers do not like litigation. Bankruptcy litigation is the process of resolving disputed legal issues in court. Most lawyers in Houston will refuse to participate in complex legal disputes that arise in bankruptcy cases, such as discharge contests, preference claim defense, fraudulent conveyances, exemption contests, mortgage disputes and automatic stay violations. Although most bankruptcy professionals dislike litigation, we enjoy the challenge involved in handling contested disputes. We will be happy to offer a second opinion and represent both debtors and creditors in litigation matters which your current lawyer may not desire or be competent to handle. We also take referrals of bankruptcy litigation cases from local attorneys that do not like or have experience handling litigation.

Practice Areas:

Chapter 7. Straight bankruptcy, also referred to as a "liquidation proceeding." Normally ends is a discharge (release) of most debts without payment or giving up any property.

Chapter 11. Reorganization of business and consumer debts. Corporations and individuals.

Chapter 13. Reorganization of business and personal debts. Only available to individuals and sole proprietorships.

Bankruptcy Litigation. Prosecution and defense of discharge and dischargeability contests, defense of preference claims, defense of fraudulent conveyance claims, defense of exemption contests, prosecution and defense of home mortgage claims, and the prosecution and defense of automatic stay violations.

What distinguishes your law firm from others?

Our Goal: Provide Competent, Efficient and Aggressive Representation at a Reasonable Price

Weber Law Firm, P.C.
William Weber

Born: 1955, Mt. Lebanon, PA.

Board Certifications: Consumer Bankruptcy Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization (1997) (recertified 2002, 2008 & 2012).

Courts Admitted: All Texas state courts (1983); U.S. District Courts Southern, Northern & Western Districts of Texas; U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (1983); U.S. Supreme Court (1994).

Memberships: Member, State Bar of Texas (1983-present); Member, State Bar of Texas, Bankruptcy Section; Member, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1998-2008, 2013-Present); Member, Houston Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1997-Present).

Significant Decisions:

Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), affirmed, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex. 2014), affirmed, , 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), reversed, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), opinion on remand, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 14750 (5th Cir. 2016).

Description: Creditor filed a dischargeability lawsuit in bankruptcy court claiming that Debtor, a shareholder and officer of a corporation, was personally liable for a contract debt owed by the corporation to a creditor. Creditor alleged that the debt owed to it was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, based on theories of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and willful injury to property under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2), (4) and (6). Creditor also alleged that an avoidable conveyance of corporate assets by Debtor was an "actual fraud" as that term is used in 523(a)(2)(A). At trial, it was undisputed that Debtor never made a false representation to Creditor. The Bankruptcy Court, after a three day trial, issued an opinion in favor of the Debtor, holding that Debtor was not guilty of actual fraud, because proof of a false representation was an essential element of a claim for actual fraud under 523(a)(2). Therefore. the debt owed to Creditor was dischargeable. On appeal, both the U.S. District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued separate opinions affirming the Bankruptcy Court decision, indicating that an avoidable conveyance of assets did not constitute "actual fraud" as used is 523(a)(2)(A), and that a false representation was an essential element of an "actual fraud" claim under 523(a)(2).

Outcome: On a further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 7 to 1 majority (Justice Thomas dissenting) reversed the opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit. It held that proof that Debtor made a false representation is not an essential element of an actual fraud claim under 523(a)(2)(A), and that an avoidable conveyance of assets made with an intent to hinder or delay creditors could constitute "actual fraud" under 523(a)(2)(A).

McDonald, 486 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

Description: Did Debtor abandon her homestead by temporarily moving from her Texas home to New Orleans to pursue an employment opportunity.

Outcome: No. Debtor did not abandon her homestead under the circumstances. A homestead exemption may be lost or abandoned by a removal from the premises under circumstances clearly indicating that the removal is not merely temporary. A homestead claimant is not required to remain on the homestead property at all times; rather, the claimant may be absent from the property as long as the absence is temporary. One does not necessarily abandon a homestead by merely moving his home. The length of time of an absence is not dispositive in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent; rather, the overriding consideration in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent is the homestead claimant's intent.

Oparaji v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Oparaji), 454 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010), affirmed, 458 B.R. 881 (S.D. Tex. 2011), reversed, 698 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2013).

Description: Plaintiff Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion for summary judgment on his claim that defendant creditor should be judicially estopped from asserting charges that could have been, but were not, included in its proof of claim filed in debtor's previous bankruptcy case.

Outcome: In the Bankruptcy Court and District Court appeal, the Courts ruled the Creditor was judicially estopped from claiming charges or fees in a second bankruptcy case that were inconsistent with charges or fees claimed in a proof of claim filed in a prior, dismissed bankruptcy case. This ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Endeavour GP, LLC v. Endeavour Highrise, L.P. et al, 432 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).

Description: Is an IRA Account a proper party that may be named as a party to a lawsuit?

Outcome: Yes. If faced with the issue of an IRA's ability to be sued, the Texas Supreme Court would decide that IRAs should be treated like trusts.

See other significant cases at: http://weberlaw.com/attorney/

License

Bar Number: 21045500
Texas, 1983

Education

Ohio University
A.B. (summa cum laude), 1979

University of Houston Law Center
J.D. (cum laude) (Class Rank: 19/332 top 6%)., 1983

Weber Law Firm, P.C.
William Weber

Born: 1955, Mt. Lebanon, PA.

Board Certifications: Consumer Bankruptcy Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization (1997) (recertified 2002, 2008 & 2012).

Courts Admitted: All Texas state courts (1983); U.S. District Courts Southern, Northern & Western Districts of Texas; U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (1983); U.S. Supreme Court (1994).

Memberships: Member, State Bar of Texas (1983-present); Member, State Bar of Texas, Bankruptcy Section; Member, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1998-2008, 2013-Present); Member, Houston Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (1997-Present).

Significant Decisions:

Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), affirmed, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex. 2014), affirmed, , 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), reversed, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), opinion on remand, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 14750 (5th Cir. 2016).

Description: Creditor filed a dischargeability lawsuit in bankruptcy court claiming that Debtor, a shareholder and officer of a corporation, was personally liable for a contract debt owed by the corporation to a creditor. Creditor alleged that the debt owed to it was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, based on theories of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and willful injury to property under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2), (4) and (6). Creditor also alleged that an avoidable conveyance of corporate assets by Debtor was an "actual fraud" as that term is used in 523(a)(2)(A). At trial, it was undisputed that Debtor never made a false representation to Creditor. The Bankruptcy Court, after a three day trial, issued an opinion in favor of the Debtor, holding that Debtor was not guilty of actual fraud, because proof of a false representation was an essential element of a claim for actual fraud under 523(a)(2). Therefore. the debt owed to Creditor was dischargeable. On appeal, both the U.S. District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued separate opinions affirming the Bankruptcy Court decision, indicating that an avoidable conveyance of assets did not constitute "actual fraud" as used is 523(a)(2)(A), and that a false representation was an essential element of an "actual fraud" claim under 523(a)(2).

Outcome: On a further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 7 to 1 majority (Justice Thomas dissenting) reversed the opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit. It held that proof that Debtor made a false representation is not an essential element of an actual fraud claim under 523(a)(2)(A), and that an avoidable conveyance of assets made with an intent to hinder or delay creditors could constitute "actual fraud" under 523(a)(2)(A).

McDonald, 486 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).

Description: Did Debtor abandon her homestead by temporarily moving from her Texas home to New Orleans to pursue an employment opportunity.

Outcome: No. Debtor did not abandon her homestead under the circumstances. A homestead exemption may be lost or abandoned by a removal from the premises under circumstances clearly indicating that the removal is not merely temporary. A homestead claimant is not required to remain on the homestead property at all times; rather, the claimant may be absent from the property as long as the absence is temporary. One does not necessarily abandon a homestead by merely moving his home. The length of time of an absence is not dispositive in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent; rather, the overriding consideration in determining whether an absence is temporary or permanent is the homestead claimant's intent.

Oparaji v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Oparaji), 454 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010), affirmed, 458 B.R. 881 (S.D. Tex. 2011), reversed, 698 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2013).

Description: Plaintiff Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion for summary judgment on his claim that defendant creditor should be judicially estopped from asserting charges that could have been, but were not, included in its proof of claim filed in debtor's previous bankruptcy case.

Outcome: In the Bankruptcy Court and District Court appeal, the Courts ruled the Creditor was judicially estopped from claiming charges or fees in a second bankruptcy case that were inconsistent with charges or fees claimed in a proof of claim filed in a prior, dismissed bankruptcy case. This ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Endeavour GP, LLC v. Endeavour Highrise, L.P. et al, 432 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).

Description: Is an IRA Account a proper party that may be named as a party to a lawsuit?

Outcome: Yes. If faced with the issue of an IRA's ability to be sued, the Texas Supreme Court would decide that IRAs should be treated like trusts.

See other significant cases at: http://weberlaw.com/attorney/

License

Bar Number: 21045500
Texas, 1983

Education

Ohio University A.B. (summa cum laude), 1979


University of Houston Law Center J.D. (cum laude) (Class Rank: 19/332 top 6%)., 1983


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